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A longstanding literature implicates activity within the default mode network (DMN) to 
processes linked to the self. However, contemporary work suggests that other largescale 
networks networks might also be involved. For instance, goaldirected autobiographical 
planning requires positive functional connectivity (FC) between DMN and frontoparietal 
control (FPCN) networks. The present study examined the interrelationship between trait 
selffocus (measured via a selfconsciousness scale; SCS), incidental memory in a self
reference paradigm, and resting state FC of largescale networks. Behaviourally, we found 
that private SCS was linked to stronger incidental memory for selfrelevant information. We 
also examined how patterns of FC differed according to levels of selfconsciousness by 
using the SCS data to drive multiple regression analyses with seeds from the DMN, the 
FPCN and the limbic network. High levels of SCS was not linked to differences in the 
functional behaviour of the DMN, however, it was linked to stronger FC between FPCN and 
a cluster extending into the hippocampus, which meta analytic decoding using Neurosynth 
linked to episodic memory retrieval. Subsequent analysis demonstrated that trait variance in 
this pattern of FC was a moderator for the observed relationship between private SCS and 
enhanced memory for selfitems. Together these findings suggest that interactions between 
the FPCN and hippocampus may support the memory advantage of selfrelevant information 
associated with SCS and  confirm theoretical positions that argue that that selfrelated 
processing does not simply depend upon the DMN, but instead relies on complex patterns of 
interactions between multiple largescale networks. 
Keywords: selfconsciousness, restingstate functional connectivity, selfreference memory 
advantage.  
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Human cognition is characterised by the capacity for selfconsciousness – the process 
through which we can become the subject of our own conscious experience. The degree to 
which individuals engage in selfconsciousness appears early in development (Berthental & 
Fischer, 1978; Lewis & Brooks, 1978; Lipka & Brinthaupt, 1992), and it can have both 
positive and negative outcomes in daily life. For example, the ability to reflect on our own 
thoughts and actions is crucial for the development of personal identity (Turner, 1978); 
however, when taken to extremes, the same process can result in excessive shyness or 
anxiety (Crozier, 2002). A well established measure of selfconsciousness (Carver & Glass, 
1976; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Scheier & Carver, 2013) divides the construct into three 
related, yet independent, dimensions: 1) private selfconsciousness, which describes the 
extent to which people introspect and examine hidden aspects of the self (e.g. their beliefs or 
values), 2) public selfconsciousness, which describes the extent to which people examine 
how public aspects of the self may be perceived by others (e.g. what impression others 
might form), and 3) social anxiety, which describes the extent to which people react to 
perceptions of their public self and evaluations from others.  
 
When people engage in selfconscious thought, schema containing selfrelevant information 
are activated (Nasby, 1985) and this information possesses special mnemonic qualities. For 
example, people have a robust tendency to remember information more effectively when it is 
processed with respect to the self, a bias resulting in better memory recall for selfrelated 
information (termed “The selfreference effect”; Rogers et al, 1977). One possibility is that 
the selfreference effect is simply an indirect consequence of familiarity: selfrelevant 
information is likely to be highly familiar and familiarity is known to facilitate encoding 
(Prentice, 1990). However, research has ruled out familiarity as the mechanism underlying 
the selfreference effect because a selfreferent bias has also been observed for neutral 
shapes (Humphreys & Sui, 2015) and everyday items (Cunningham et al., 2011). Instead, 
selfreference is thought to improve memory because of the rich network of associations 
associated with ourselves which in turn allows for the formation of stronger memory traces 
(Symons & Johnson, 1997). As well as its effect on memory, selfrelevant information has 
strong salient properties which impact on attention (Sui et al, 2015), with studies showing 
that one’s name (Harris & Pashler, 2004) or face (Brédart et al, 2006) can act like an efficient 
distractor. Moreover, other studies have shown that selfrelevant information has similar 
properties to salient perceptual stimuli, automatically triggering the reallocation of attentional 
resources (Sui et al, 2015). These experimental paradigms share similarities with more 
naturalistic mental processes such as mindwandering, where salient selfrelevant 
information becomes the focus of conscious attention when we are otherwise engaged in 
external tasks (Smallwood et al., 2011). Although mindwandering can often be associated 
with task errors (McVay & Kane, 2009; Weissman et al., 2006), the reallocation of attention 
towards the self during a task may serve a broader function because it can facilitate the 
processing of personally meaningful goals that extend beyond the hereandnow (Medea et 
al., 2016; for a review see Poerio & Smallwood, 2016). 
 
Recent neuroimaging work has examined the neural basis of the process of selfreflection, 
a process important for selfconsciousness (Grant et al., 2002). Taskbased studies of self
reference often observe activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), as well as regions in 
the posterior cingulate cortex (Kelley et al., 2002, Macrae et al., 2004; Northoff et al., 2006), 
regions that collectively form what is known as the default mode network (DMN). This large
scale network tends to show a pattern of deactivation during demanding external tasks 
(Raichle et al, 2001) and shows coherent activity during the resting state (Greicius et al., 
2003 In addition, the DMN has also been linked to states of selfgenerated thought, such as 
mindwandering (for recent metaanalyses see Fox et al., 2015; Stawarczyk & 
D'Argembeau, 2015). Recent work, however, suggests that the DMN often works in tandem 
with the other networks when internal representation must be manipulated in a goal directed 
fashion. For example, regions of lateral frontal and parietal cortex (that together form the 
frontoparietal control network; FPCN), become coupled with the DMN when autobiographical 
information is organised to form a plan (Spreng et al., 2010) and when identifying perceptual 
aspects of semantic processing (KriegerRedwood et al., 2016). Moreover, extensive 
research has related regions in the FPCN to sustained attention and working memory (Coull 
et al., 1996, Koechlin et al., 1999; Rottschy et al., 2012), processes that allow conscious 
manipulation of information. These findings, along with those from Spreng and colleagues 
(2010), suggest that processing of selfrelated information present during selfconsciousness 
may recruit the executive system anchored in the FPCN. It is a possibility that differences 
across individuals in their attentional preferences, i.e, how often one engages in self
conscious thought versus other types of information, is reflected in the FC of the FPCN. 
Moreover a study conducted by Eisenberger and colleagues (2005) found a relationship 
between activity in a cluster in the FPCN, namely in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and 
selfconsciousness during a vigilance task. Similarly, studies have shown that when 
participants hold social information in mind they use lateral regions of cortex linked to 
executive control processes (Meyer et al., 2012). In addition to the DMN and the FPCN, the 
limbic system may also play an important role in selforiented cognition. Extensive research 
has shown that negative mood increases selffocussed attention (Sedikides, 1992) as well 
as mindwandering (Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2009) and some studies have 
suggested that the effect of mood on information processing in turn predicts later behaviour 
(Gendolla, 2000). Moreover, neuroimaging research has shown a distinction within the 
mPFC between cognitive and affective components of selforiented cognition (Moran et al., 
2006) while the amygdala, a main hub of the limbic system, is important in a range of 
psychiatric conditions associated with disturbances in the self (Davidson 2002; Phan et al., 
2006; Strakowski et al., 1999). 
 
The current study aimed to determine the functional architecture that underpins different 
forms of selfconsciousness (private, public and social anxiety) and to understand how this is 
related to the strength of a person’s memory for selfrelevant information. We recorded 
functional imaging data in a large cohort of participants during wakeful rest who later 
completed the three subscales of the SelfConsciousness Scale (SCS, Scheier & Carver, 
2013). Previous research has consistently found a positive relationship between private self
consciousness scores and the magnitude of the selfreference effect (Agatstein & Buchanan, 
1984; Hull et al., 1988; Nasby, 1985; Turner, 1980) and so in this experiment we also 
measured incidental memory for selfrelevant information in our participants. We 
hypothesised that differences in response on the SCS should be reflected in the connectivity 
patterns of three largescale networks (Default Mode, Frontoparietal Control and Limbic). To 
select these largescale networks we used a parcellation obtained by Yeo and colleagues 
who applied clustering techniques to resting state data of 1000 individuals (Yeo et al., 2011). 
We were interested in (a) replicating prior findings linking high levels of private self
consciousness to better memory for the self, (b) identifying patterns of functional connectivity 
of the DMN, FPCN and Limbic networks associated with different aspects of self
consciousness and (c) determining whether any neurocognitive patterns linked to different 
types of selfconsciousness explained the hypothesised selfmemory advantage.  
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A hundred and forty one healthy righthanded participants were recruited to the study; in 
exchange for participation they received a monetary reward or course credits. The sample 
had an average age of 22.50 (SD = 2.93) years.  Approval for this project was granted by the 
York Neuroimaging Centre (YNiC) Ethics Committee and was conducted in accordance with 
the ethical standards of the responsible committee on human experimentation (institutional 
and national) and with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, as revised in 2008.  
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Participants completed a 22item version of the selfconsciousness scale inventory (Scheier 
& Carver, 2013) from which three subscales can be derived: private selfconsciousness, 
public selfconsciousness and social anxiety. Private selfconsciousness is a measure of the 
tendency that an individual has to introspect and study one’s inner self and motives and was 
assessed with nine statements such as “I’m always trying to figure myself out”.  Public self
consciousness refers to the tendency of an individual to think about what others think about 
him/her, and was assessed through seven statements such as “I care a lot about how I 
present myself to others” Finally social anxiety was measured with six statements such as “It 
takes me time to get over my shyness in new situations”. Participants had to answer to each 
statement using a scale from 0 (not at all like me) to 3 (a lot like me).  Items from each 
subscale were summed to create an overall score per scale. 
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The laboratory task measuring the selfreference memory advantage involved an evaluation 
and a retrieval phase. The evaluation phase consisted of two social conditions and one 
syllable count condition. In the social conditions participants were asked to make decisions 
about the association between adjectives and one of two referents (‘Self’ or ‘Lady Gaga’). In 
the syllable condition, participants indicated via button press whether the word on screen 
had three or more syllables or whether it had less. Adjectives were presented sequentially 
onscreen and participants were required to indicate whether each adjective applied to a 
particular referent/ had three or more syllables by pressing ‘Y’ with the index finger of their 
right hand for ‘yes’ or ‘N’ with the index finger of their left hand for ‘no’. All words were 
selected from a pool of normalised personality trait adjectives with meaningfulness and 
likeability ratings (Anderson, 1968). An equal amount of positive, negative and neutral 
adjectives (40 adjectives /valence) with the highest meaningfulness rating were selected for 
this experiment. For each participant, these 120 words were randomly divided into two lists 
of 60 adjectives. One list contained all the items involved during the encoding phase, the 
other  list contained the items that would be used as foils during the retrieval phase. This first 
encodingphase list was divided into three lists of 20 items, each of which was assigned to 
one of the three conditions (Self, Lady Gaga, Syllables). Finally, these conditionspecific lists 
were subdivided into two 10item lists, one list per experimental block. During encoding, 
participants were presented with these lists in separate blocks in an ABCCBA order allowing 
us to control for order effects within each participant. We also counterbalanced the order in 
which each category was presented across participants. Each block was preceded by a 
screen indicating the specific condition and each block started after the participants button 
press. Stimuli were separated by an interstimulus interval of 5000ms during which 
participants were shown a blank screen with a fixation cross. Following the evaluation 
phase, participants were presented with a surprise retrieval test in which they were 
sequentially shown words and asked whether or not that particular item had been presented 
in the previous phase. This retrieval phase contained all the words from the previous stage 
of the experiment, plus an equal number of new words contained in the retrieval list. Items 
were presented in a random order and participants had to either press ‘O’ for old if they 
thought the word had appeared before or ‘N’ for new if they thought it was a new word. The 
old/new responses judged as “old” were followed by a source localisation judgement in 
which participants had to indicate using arrow heads whether they thought the old word had 
been presented during the self, the Lady Gaga or the syllablecount condition. Confidence 
ratings ranging from 1 (not confident at all) to 6 (very confident) for each old/new and source 
localisation judgements were also obtained. At the end of the experiment, familiarity ratings 
for Lady Gaga were obtained to control for the possible effects familiarity could have on 
memory. This paradigm allowed for 12 types of response types. Hits are considered old 
words that were correctly identified as old and correctly localised during the source 
localisation phase. This results in either “Self hits”, “Lady Gaga hits” or “syllable hits”.  Old 
words judged as new would be considered misses, again resulting in either a “self miss”, a 
“Lady Gaga miss” or a “syllables miss”. New words judged as new were considered “correct 
rejections”, and new words judged as old were considered “false alarms”. Based on the 
incorrect source localisation of these new words, these can further be subdivided into “Self 
false alarms”, “Lady Gaga false alarms” or “syllable false alarms”. The false alarms 
measures specific to each referent allowed us to control for guessing at a referent specific 
level by subtracting them from the hits. Lastly, if an old word from, for example, the syllable 
condition was judged as old but then incorrectly source localised as Lady Gaga it was 
considered a “wrong source localisation from syllables to Lady Gaga condition”.  
	


			
Functional MRI data was acquired on a 3 Tesla GE scanner. Participants observed a fixation 
cross for a scan that lasted 9 minutes. The scan had a repetition time of 2 seconds, resulting 
in 210 volumes. We used interleaved slicetiming and isotropic voxel dimensions of 3 mm3 
(matrix size of 64 X 64, 192mm field of view, and 32 slices) with a 0.5mm gap between 
slices. 
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All fMRI preprocessing and analysis was performed using FSL. We extracted the brain from 
the skull using the BET toolbox for both the flair and the structural T1 weighted images and 
these scans were registered to standard MNI152 (2mm) space using FLIRT (Jenkinson & 
Smith, 2001). Prior to conducting the functional connectivity analysis, the following pre
statistics processing was applied to the resting state data; motion correction using MCFLIRT 
(Jenkinson et al., 2002); slicetiming correction using Fourierspace timeseries phase
shifting; nonbrain removal using BET (Smith 2002); spatial smoothing using a Gaussian 
kernel of FWHM 6mm; grandmean intensity normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a 
single multiplicative factor; highpass temporal filtering (Gaussianweighted leastsquares 
straight line fitting, with sigma = 100 s; Gaussian lowpass temporal filtering, with sigma = 
2.8s.).
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Following these steps, the time series of 3 masks of interest (ROI) were extracted. These 
masks corresponded to 1) the DMN, 2) the FPCN and 3) the limbic system as defined by the 
7 network parcellation performed by Yeo and colleagues (Yeo et al., 2011) and can be 
visualised in Figure 2. The approach of selecting largescale network masks was based on 
previous studies using dualregression, in which networks obtained through ICA group 
analyses are used as regions of interest in subsequent seed based analyses (Zuo et al., 
2010; Rytty et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2014). Instead of using ICA group masks as regions of 
interest the current study used a reliable parcellation based on 1000 subjects (Yeo et al., 
2011).  
The parcellations in non linear MNI152 volume space were downloaded from 
https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/fswiki/CorticalParcellation_Yeo2011  and resampled from 
1mm3 to 2mm3.  The time series for each voxel within each mask were averaged and used 
as an explanatory variable in a subjectlevel functional connectivity (FC) analysis, which also 
included the following nuisance regressors: the first five principal timeseries components 
extracted from white matter (WM) and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) masks in accordance with 
the CompCor method (Behzadi et al. 2007) and six motion parameters. WM and CSF masks 
were generated by segmenting each individual’s highresolution structural image (using 
FAST in FSL). The default tissue probability maps, referred to as Prior Probability Maps 
(PPM), were registered to each individual’s highresolution structural image (T1 space) and 
the overlap between these PPM and the corresponding CSF and WM maps was identified. 
Finally, these maps were thresholded (40% for the SCF and 66% for the WM), binarised and 
combined. The six motion parameters were calculated in the motioncorrection step during 
preprocessing. Linear displacements in each of the three Cartesian directions (x, y, z) and 
rotations around three axes (pitch, yaw, roll) were included for each individual. No global 
signal regression was performed (Murphy et al., 2009). 
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To understand whether our psychological measures of selfconsciousness varied with either 
the between or within connectivity of the DMN, limbic and the FPCN, we used FSL to 
conduct a grouplevel regression of the connectivity matrices of each mask. In this analysis 
we included the residualised mean centred scores for the three selfconsciousness 
subscales as regressors of interest. In order to control for spurious correlations related to 
subject motion we included framewise displacement as a regressor of no interest, after 
controlling for four outliers by imputing their data to 2 standard deviations (Power et al., 
2012). See Sormaz et al., (2017) for a prior demonstration of this approach. This technique 
allows us to examine regions within or outside the network mask whose connectivity varies 
with particular traits (in this case different aspects of selfconsciousness). In these analyses 
the data were processed using FEAT version 5.98 part of FSL (FMRIB's Software 
Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) and the analyses were carried out using FMRIB's Local 
Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME). A grey matter mask with a probability threshold of 40% 
was used as a prethresholding mask and the clusterforming threshold was set as zscore 
of 2.3. For these analyses we controlled for Type I errors by controlling for the number of 
voxels in the brain (Worsley 2001), as well as the number of masks and the two tailed nature 
of our comparisons yielding an alpha value of <.008 FWE.   
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In order to interpret neurocognitive patterns of functional connectivity predictive of self
consciousness, we performed a metaanalysis using the online Neurosynth database 
(Yarkoni et al., 2011).  We performed a metaanalytic decoding of the unthresholded maps 
produced in this study by uploading them onto Neurosynth. This allows the identification of 
psychological terms that are most likely to be associated with the specific spatial pattern that 
our analysis highlighted providing a quantitative interpretation of our data (for a prior 
illustration of this technique see de Sormaz et al., 2017). For the purposes of 
interpretationwe selected the 15 terms most related to the current spatial maps and 
displayed them in the form of word clouds in which a larger font size indicated a greater 
probability of association.   
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The three subscales (private, public and social anxiety) for the selfconsciousness 
questionnaire were calculated for each individual. The public subscale was correlated with 
both the private ( = .40, < .001) and the social anxiety scale ( = 0.35,  < .001). No 
significant correlations were found between the private and the social anxiety subscales (r = 
.11, "#$. In order to control for these correlations, the standardised residual scores were 
used in further analyses. 
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The first aim of our study was to establish whether in our sample we found a reliable self
relevant memory advantage. A repeated measures oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
using the proportion of hits for each referent as the withinparticipants factor indicated a 
significant effect of referent on incidental memory performance ((2, 278) = 284,  < .001), 
as measured during the retrieval phase of the selfother reference paradigm. Posthoc 
pairedsamples t–tests were conducted to compare incidental memory across the three 
conditions (self, Lady Gaga, syllable count). Participants had significantly better memory in 
the self (% = 0.78, & = 0.15) compared to the Lady Gaga (% = 0.62, & = 0.19) condition; 
(139) = 10.85,  < .001; they also showed significantly better memory in the self compared 
to the syllable count(% = 0.4, & = 0.18) condition;  (139)= 23.56,  < .001. Participants 
also had significantly better memory in the Lady Gaga compared to the syllable condition; 
(139) = 12.87,  <  .001 (Figure 1A). In addition, examination of the confidence intervals 
obtained from onesample ttests suggested memory for the syllable condition was at 
chance (95% CI [.37,.44], whereas memory for Lady Gaga (95% CI [.60,.66]) and self (95% 
CI [.76,.81]) were both above chance performance.  
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Next, we sought to identify whether in our sample individuals high in private self
consciousness have a stronger memory when referring information to themselves rather 
than a familiar other (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Hull et al., 1988; Nasby, 1985; Turner, 
1980). In order to explore this possibility, we conducted we a repeated measures analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA). The withinsubject factors included the main effects for the incidental 
memory for self and Lady Gaga items (corrected for guessing). The different types of self
consciousness scores were included as between participant covariates. This analysis 
revealed a significant interaction between the incidental memory for the two referents and 
the private selfconsciousness scale (F (1,116) = 5.041, '(# ).   Post hoc analyses 
demonstrated a significant positive correlation between the magnitude of the selfreference 
effect and  private selfconsciousness ( = .19,  < .035) (Figure 1B). Based on previous 
research revealing that familiarity has a significant influence on memory, familiarity ratings 
for Lady Gaga were obtained at the end of the experiment. A partial correlation controlling 
for the Lady Gaga familiarity ratings still showed a positive and significant correlation 
between the private selfconsciousness scores and the magnitude of the selfreferent effect 
both controlling for false alarms (= .18, = .030) and without controlling for false alarms ( 
= .19,  = .035). Together these analyses allowed us to establish in our sample that private 
selfconsciousness is linked to a stronger memory for information referred to the self. 
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Next, we explored whether selfconsciousness is reflected in the brain’s intrinsic connectivity 
by performing a seed based analyses on the DMN, FPCN and limbic networks defined by 
the 7 network parcellation from Yeo and colleagues (Yeo et al., 2011). We calculated the 
correlation between the time series for each of these networks and each voxel in the rest of 
the brain for each individual. The functional connectivity group maps obtained for each 
network can be visualised in Figure 3. Next, we used these spatial maps as the dependent 
variable in a series of multiple regressions using the standardised residuals of each 
component of the SCS as explanatory variables. Correction for multiple comparisons 
included a whole brain correction, correction for twotailed tests and correction for the 
number of seeded locations (3), yielding an alpha value of "008 FWE. 
We found two patterns of functional connectivity that varied with different types of self
consciousness. The FPCN revealed a pattern of stronger FC between this network and a 
cluster with a peak in the temporal occipital fusiform cortex that extended into the 
hippocampus with greater levels of private selfconsciousness (Figure 4, top row). The 
unthresholded map for this contrast can be found at Neurovault at the following link: 
http://neurovault.org/images/39599/. Possibly due to the fusiform nature of the cluster, meta
analyitic decoding using Neurosynth revealed terms such as “objects”, however it also 
revealed terms such as “episodic”, “recognition” and “episodic memory” terms which are 
consistent with the hypothesised relationship between mnemonic processes and high levels 
of private selfconsciousness.  The limbic network revealed a pattern of functional 
connectivity to the occipital cortex predictive of social anxiety. In particular, stronger 
functional connectivity between these regions was predictive of higher social anxiety scores 
(Figure 4, bottom row). The unthresholded map for this contrast can be found at this link: 
http://neurovault.org/images/39600/ and metaanalytic decoding revealed this map to be 
related, among others, to the term “face”, which is in line with the social nature of this type of 
anxiety. Finally, analyses of the DMN did not reveal any patterns of functional connectivity 
predictive of either types of selfconsciousness that passed correction for multiple 
comparisons, although all unthresholded maps are available at the following URL: 
http://neurovault.org/images/43237/ and http://neurovault.org/collections/2284/. To 
understand these patterns of data in greater detail we extracted the connectivity with the 
relevant networks and the region identified through our analyses and plotted these as 
scatterplots in each figure.  The details of these clusters can be found in Table 1. 
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Having identified that private selfconsciousness is linked to better memory for information 
related to the self and that it is also associated with patterns of functional organisation at 
rest, we next explored whether the expression of better self memory can be related to these 
patterns of functional organisation. In these analyses we used the correlation coefficients 
between the FPCN and the cluster in the temporal occipital fusiform cortex as a moderator of 
the relationship between private selfconsciousness and the task outcomes. Moderation 
analyses using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) revealed that the functional connectivity between 
the FPCN and the temporal occipital fusiform cluster moderated the relationship between 
private selfconsciousness and the magnitude of the selfreference effect, ∆2 = .037, (1, 
119) = 4.846.08* ' (#. This can be visualised in Figure 5 in which the data has been 
divided using a median split of the FC coefficients. Here it is apparent that the positive 
relationship found between private SCS and the magnitude of the selfreference effect is 
present in individuals with a high FC between the FPCN and the temporal occipital fusiform 
cortex (".334, "() and absent in individuals situated below the median ( = .03, "
+$ (Figure 5B).  
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Our data suggest that the tendency towards private selfconsciousness is characterised by a 
memory bias for selfrelevant information that is rooted in the functional organisation of the 
brain at rest. We replicated prior studies showing that high levels of private self
consciousness are associated with a mnemonic advantage for selfrelevant information 
(Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Hull et al., 1988; Nasby, 1985; Turner, 1980). Our functional 
connectivity analyses indicated that private selfconsciousness was also associated with 
strong connectivity between the FPCN and regions of lateral occipital cortex, fusiform cortex 
and hippocampus, a pattern that metaanalytic decoding suggests is often associated with 
functions including episodic memory. Critically, our moderation analysis demonstrated that 
these two effects are related: we found that the relationship between private self
consciousness and a heightened memory for the self was only present in participants who 
exhibited this episodic neural fingerprint at rest. Taken together, our results suggest that 
patterns of neural organisation associated with the effective retrieval of episodic details may 
be central to the ability to consciously reflect on who we are as indexed by private self
consciousness. They also support functional studies linking executive regions to process of 
selfconsciousness (Eisenberger et al., 2005) and when working memory is focused on more 
personally relevant information (Meyer et al., 2012). Our study also raises the question of 
whether these patterns exhibited by individuals high on private selfconsciousness may also 
have a relationship to the thoughts experienced during the resting state, a question that 
could be addressed using experience sampling after resting state scans (for examples see 
Gorgolewski et al., 2014, Smallwood et al., 2016). 
Unlike private selfconsciousness, we found that social anxiety was related to heightened 
connectivity between the limbic network and regions of visual cortex. It is not surprising that 
the FC of the limbic system predicted social anxiety scores, given the well documented links 
between these regions and emotion (Cardinal et al., 2002; Davidson 2002; Phan et al., 
2006; Phelps & DeLoux, 2005; Strakowski et al., 1999). Moreover, our analysis suggests 
that social anxiety is linked to heightened connectivity between the limbic system and 
regions of occipital cortex, a pattern that may explain the hyper vigilance to social cues that 
are often associated with this form of selfconsciousness (Eysenck 1992; Mogg & Bradley 
1998). Thus unlike private selfconsciousness, which was linked to heightened memory, our 
data is consistent with the view that social anxiety is linked to an attentional bias concerned 
with external attention, potentially to the reaction of other people to the public self (Bögels & 
Mansell, 2004; Mueller et al., 2009). It will be important in the future to determine whether 
the pattern of functional connectivity that we show supports social anxiety is a moderator for 
some of the attentional biases that this trait has been linked to in the past. 
Our analysis did not link the DMN to any of the types of selfconsciousness measured in our 
study. Our analytic strategy highlights differences between types of selfconsciousness, so it 
is possible that the absence of any observed associations with the DMN may be because 
this network plays a role common to all three types of selfconsciousness. Given evidence 
that the DMN is activated by states of selffocus (Andrews‐Hanna et al., 2014; Northoff et al., 
2006) perhaps the absence of an association with this system reflects the fact that it is 
generally important in all states of selfconsciousness, rather than in the expression of 
specific types. On the other hand, our observation that private selfconsciousness is 
described by the connectivity of the FPCN supports accounts of states of selffocus which 
have linked selfbiases to the function of regions of the control networks such as the inter
parietal sulcus (Sui et al, 2015; Humphreys & Sui 2016). More broadly, our findings are 
consistent with theoretical positions that advocate a more complex component process 
architecture for states of higherorder cognition, such that different types of cognition emerge 
through the interaction of multiple different large scale networks (for examples see Ralph et 
al., 2016; Moscovitch et al., 2016; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). For example, an 
emerging literature has begun to show that the DMN is important in many situations beyond 
those linked to internal focus, such as working memory (Konishi et al., 2015; Vatansever et 
al., 2015), social memory (Meyer et al., 2012), or demanding semantic task performance 
(KriegerRedwood et al., 2016), observations that are consistent with the notion that the 
DMN acts to integrate information from across the cortex (Margulies et al., 2016). For 
example, research exploring autobiographical planning has shown coactivation in the FPCN 
and medial temporal lobe structures (e.g. the hippocampus) when we consider future goals 
(Gerlach et al., 2011), particularly those that are high on episodic detail (Spreng, et al., 
2010). It is possible, for example, that trait levels of private selfconsciousness may relate to 
particular aspects of mental life characterised by simulations of the future that contain high 
levels of detail, a perspective that is supported by studies that have shown priming self
relevant information increases an individual’s tendency to consider events in the future 
(Smallwood et al., 2011). This is an important question for future research to address.  
One limitation of our study is that we focused on a relatively coarse description of neural 
function that is characterized by a neural parcellation that divides the cortical landscape into 
seven largescale networks. Recent accounts of the DMN suggest that it can be subdivided 
into different subnetworks (e.g. Yeo et al., 2011, AndrewsHanna et al., 2010). One of these 
subdivisions, known as the medialtemporal subsystem, encompasses regions of posterior 
parietal cortex, but critically aspects of the medial temporal lobe. It is therefore possible that 
a more finegrained analysis of the relationship between DMN subnetworks at rest and 
different aspects of selfconsciousness would have revealed a role for one of these 
subsystems. Although our coarse analysis revealed patterns of neural activity that described 
two out of three forms of selfconsciousness it remains an open question whether looking at 
the behaviour of subsystems of the DMN at rest, or during tasks, may reveal a role for 
aspects of this large scale network in trait differences in selfconsciousness. Not 
withstanding this limitation, our current study suggests that trait variation in private self
consciousness is related to the FC of the FPCN, and in particular to its communication with 
regions involved in episodic memory retrieval. This pattern of FC moderates the association 
between private selfconsciousness and a heightened memory for selfrelevant information, 
identified by prior investigations. Together these findings suggest that a greater capacity for 
the retrieval of self relevant information may explain important aspects of the processes 
through which we become the subject of our own conscious evaluations. 
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Table 1 
Regions that exhibit FC to seed dependent upon SCS 
Seed Contrast Cluster Regions Peak  #voxels pvalue 
FPCN Private Up Temporal posterior inferior temporal, 
temporal occipital fusiform, 
parahippocampal, 
hippocampus 
48,52,28 1085 .006 
Limbic Social 
Anxiety Up 
Occipital inferior lateral occipital, 
intracalcarine, lingual gyrus 
8,90,10 1324 .001 
Note: Coordinates are based on the Montreal Neurological Institute coordinate system and regions 
are based on HarvardOxford Cortical Structural Atlas.  
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